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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff Appellee,
v.

:

CURTIS W. COLLINS,

:

Case No. 20010371-CA

:

Priority No. 10

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from an interlocutory order denying his motion to suppress
evidence in a case charging him with possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) within 1000 feet of a public structure, public parking lot, or child care
facility, which charge is subject to enhancement based on defendant's prior conviction, and,
therefore, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2001).
This Court has jurisdiction based on its order granting interlocutory review and pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 2001).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Does a police search of an individual, being taken into protective custody pursuant
to Utah's involuntary commitment statutes, qualify for exception to the Fourth Amendment's

warrant requirement as either a search incident to custody or as emergency aid?
"In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, [the appellate
court] will not overturn its factual findings absent clear error. The trial court's legal
conclusions, however, we review for correctness.'" State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332,
If 8, 37 P.3d 260 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The issue presented implicates the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, but the language of the amendment is not determinative.2 The following
statutory provisions, reproduced in Addendum A, are controlling:
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-12-231 (1997) - Involuntary Commitment Procedures;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-12-232 (1997) - Temporary Commitment Requirements and Procedures.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 1,2000, defendant was charged with second degree felony possession
of methamphetamine (R. 1-2). Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over
for trial (R. 27-28). He later filed a motion to suppress 1he drugs seized from his person

1

Defendant lists three issues in his Table of Contents, two in his Statement of
Issues, and then presents one combined argument. See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.J at i,
5-6, & 12-19. The State responds to all arguments in a single point.
2

Defendant alludes to but does analyze article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution (Br.Aplt. at 10 & 18), and thus fails to properly raise a separate state
constitutional claim. See City ofOrem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah App.
1994).
2

when he was taken into protective custody pursuant to his involuntary commitment to a
mental health unit (R. 37-38).
Because the trial judge conducted the preliminary hearing and was familiar with the
facts, the trial judge and counsel agreed that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary to
resolve the motion to suppress (R. 27-28; R.69: 32-34). It was decided that "if there's going
to be an issue on the testimony, it would be a lot easier if [counsel] just get the videotape and
either of you make a transcript of that little portion" (R.69: 33).3
The parties briefed and argued the motions (R. 39-46, 48, 55-58, 70). The court
issued a written opinion on April 5, 2001, denying defendant's motion (R. 49-54). See
Addendum C (Memorandum Decision). Defendant filed a petition seeking interlocutory
review of the denial, which review was granted (R. 59; Order, No. 20010371-CA, 6/26/01).

3

Defendant twice suggests that the trial court did not consider the preliminary
hearing evidence in ruling on the motion to suppress and, therefore, this Court may not
consider that evidence. See Br.Aplt. at 7 n.l & 8 n.2. Defendant's assertion is
contradicted by the record. Defense counsel agreed that the trial court, having conducted
the preliminary hearing, could consider those facts in ruling on the motion to suppress,
but that counsel could also reproduce specific portions of the preliminary hearing if some
portion of the testimony was disputed (R.69: 33).
Only one portion of the testimony was disputed. Lynn Yeates, a deputy sheriff
who worked as an emergency medical technician on the day in question, testified that he
discovered a knife sheath when he undressed defendant upon admission to the hospital
(R.69: 14-17). Corrections Officer Jackie Baty testified that Yeates discovered the knife
sheath when he conducted a "complete pat-down" of defendant during the admission
process, but prior to defendant's being undressed (R.69: 20-22). Defendant attached
Baty's supplemental report to his motion to suppress, together with other documents (R.
43-46). For purposes of the hearing, the State did not dispute the facts in those reports
(R. 55). Consequently, the trial court found that the knife sheath was discovered in a patdown search during the admission process at Logan Regional Hospital (R. 50).
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are essentially undisputed.
On July 27, 2000, defendant, Curtis Collins, met with Dr. William Weber at Bear
River Mental Health (R. 43,44; R.69: 3, 6). Defendant's mother accompanied him (R. 44;
R.69: 5).

During the appointment, defendant "gradually revved up, demonstrating

confusion," and "pressured speech" (R. 43). Defendant was unable to control his "rapidly
escalating repetitive and threatening behavior" and was "unresponsive to verbal intervention"
(id.). Defendant's behavior continued to become more violent, irrational, and out-of-control
(R. 43-44). The clinic staff and defendant's mother believed their safety was threatened and
locked the building's outside doors when defendant wandered outside the building (R. 43-44;
R.69: 4-5). Defendant then began yelling and pounding on the glass doors (R. 44). Dr.
Weber concluded that defendant was off his medication and needed to be immediately
hospitalized (R. 43-44; R.69: 6). The doctor called the police (R. 43).
When Officer Erickson arrived, defendant was sitting outside the building (R.69: 4).
He was still agitated and yelling (R. 44; R.69: 4). The officer kept his distance until other
officers arrived to assist him (id.).
The officer spoke to the doctor, the caseworkers, and defendant's mother (R.69:4-6).
He also received a "Certificate for Commitment to the Local Mental Health Authority Emergency Procedure," signed by Dr. Weber, which certified that the doctor had examined
defendant and concluded that he was "mentally ill and because of that illness likely to injure
himself or others if not immediately restrained" (R. 43). Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §§
4

62A-12-231 & -232 (1997), the certificate authorized the police to take defendant into
"custody" and transport him to a mental health facility, where defendant could be
temporarily and involuntarily held (R. 43). See Addenda A (Statutes) & B (Certificate).
The police walked defendant across the parking lot to Brigham City Hospital's
emergency room to await an ambulance which would transport defendant to a mental unit
at Logan Regional Hospital (R. 44; R.69: 6-7). Before entering the emergency room, two
officers - one on each side of defendant - "checked him for weapons" by patting down the
outside of defendant's pockets and boots (R.69: 7, 29). The only objects found were two
tightly rolled magazines stuffed inside his boots (id.).4 The emergency room staff sedated
defendant to "calm him down" (R. 44; R.69: 8, 30). Officer Erickson remained with
defendant until the ambulance arrived (id.).
Lynn Yeates, a deputy county sheriff who was also an emergency medical technician,
was working as an EMT that day and assigned to the ambulance crew which transported
defendant to Logan Regional Hospital (R. 46; R.69: 13-14, 20). Officer Baty, a jail
corrections officer, also accompanied the ambulance (R. 46; R.69: 19-20).
When defendant arrived at the hospital, the hospital staff requested Yeates to assist
them in undressing defendant (R.69: 14-15). Defendant's clothes were held together with
safety pins, making the clothes difficult to remove (R.69: 22). Additionally, defendant,

4

Despite defendant's assertion that two searches occurred in the parking lot, see
Br.Aplt. at 9, the trial court found that defendant was patted own once before entering the
emergency room (R. 50). The evidence supports this finding (R.69: 7, 29).
5

though sedated, was still handcuffed (R.69: 22). Yeates recalled that he began removing
defendant's clothes when he discovered defendant's knife sheath (R.69: 14-15,17). Officer
Baty believed that Yeates had completely patted defendant down before any clothes were
removed, but also remembered the officers cutting off defendant's clothing (R. 46; R.69: 20,
22, 24, 27-28). For purposes of the motion to suppress, the court found that the sheath was
discovered in a pat down search during the admission process (R. 50).
During the pat down, a leather-like knife sheath, about 2 Vi to 3 inches long, was
discovered "next to [defendant's] crotch, next to his penis . . . between two layers of
underwear" (R.69: 15). The knife sheath was opened by Bates and/or Yeates (R.69: 16-17,
20,25). No knife was inside (R.69: 13). Instead, the sheath contained a "small plastic baggy
with a yellowish white powder inside," which appeared to be methamphetamine, together
with tin foil, a straw, and a glass pipe (R. 45; R.69: 9, 16, 20-21). The drugs were turned
over to Officer Erickson (R. 44-46; R.69: 8-9). Subsequent testing confirmed that the knife
sheath contained 620 milligrams of methamphetamine (R.69: 10).5

Yeates or a nurse also removed defendant's wallet from his pocket and handed it
to Baty, who opened it and discovered marijuana (R.69: 17, 20, 26). The present case
only charges possession of methamphetamine and the trial court's ruling only addressed
the seizure and search of the knife sheath (R.50).
6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant conceded in the trial court that the police were authorized to take him into
protective custody and were permitted to pat him down for weapons before entering the
emergency room. Nevertheless, defendant claimed that having been patted down once, the
police could not pat him down more completely before he was admitted to the mental health
unit. As the trial court correctly concluded, defendant's argument lacks merit.
Utah statutes direct the police to assist in transporting mentally ill individuals who are
being temporarily and involuntarily committed to mental health units. Implicit in this
mandate is the authority to search the person being transported for the safety of all
concerned. Moreover, an officer may search an individual being taken into protective
custody for much the same reasons an officer may search an arrestee incident to arrest. In
this case, the second pat down revealed a knife sheath, an object the officers were clearly
justified in seizing and opening. Based on the facts, the trial court properly concluded that
Utah's involuntary commitment scheme contemplated and justified the second pat down.
Alternatively, the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does not apply when
police, acting in their caretaker role, respond to an emergency. The emergency aid exception
permits a limited search when: (1) there exists an objective basis to believe that immediate
police assistance is necessary to protect life; (2) the search is not primarily motivated by an
intent to arrest or seize evidence; and (3) the search is limited to those places reasonably
connected with the emergency. In this case, the trial court properly concluded that these
criteria were met. The police were assisting in the emergency transportation and emergency
7

admission of defendant, who had been certified to be mentally ill and a danger to himself and
others. A search of defendant's person before he was admitted into the mental health unit
was necessary to ensure that he had no substances or weapons to hurt himself or others.
ARGUMENT
AS A SEARCH INCIDENT TO CUSTODY OR PURSUANT TO THE
EMERGENCY AID EXCEPTION, THE POLICE MAY SEARCH A
MENTALLY ILL AND DANGEROUS INDIVIDUAL WHO THEY ARE
STATUTORILY MANDATED TO TAKE INTO PROTECTIVE CUSTODY
AND TRANSPORT TO A MENTAL HEALTH UNIT; THEREFORE,
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS THE METHAMPHETAMINE FOUND IN DEFENDANTS
KNIFE SHEA TH DURING THE HOSPITAL ADMISSION PROCESS
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress on two grounds. "Independent
of any other analysis," the court concluded that Utah's involuntary commitment statutes
provide "implied authorization to conduct a safety and inventory search" "incident to taking
a proposed mental health patient into [protective] custody" (R. 50-51). Alternatively, the
trial court concluded that "[e]ven if the search was not impliedly authorized by the
[involuntary commitment] statute . . . the officers were engaged in a valid community
caretaking role so that the searches came within the 'emergency circumstances' exception
to the [Fourth Amendment] warrant requirement" (R. 51). See Addendum C (Memorandum
Decision). Both grounds are correct.
(A) Defendant May Not Raise Unpreserved Issues for the First Time on
Appeal.
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on

8

appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 7 4 ^ 11, 10 P.3d 346 (citation omitted). See also State
v. Pecht, 2002 UT 20, \ 18; State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, ^ 7, 36 P.3d 533.
Here, defendant raises two challenges for the first time on appeal: (1) that defendant's
detention was illegal (Br.Aplt. at 75-7(5), and (2) that the trial court denied him due process
in ruling on the motion to suppress (Br.Aplt. at 14-15). Because defendant failed to preserve
these claims in the trial court, appellate review of their merits is precluded.6
Below, defendant conceded that defendant's detention was legal. At the hearing on
the motion to suppress, defense counsel conceded that pursuant to the Certificate for
Commitment, authorized by UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-12-231 & -232 (1997), the police
"had the obligation to transport" defendant to the mental health unit (R.70: 4). See Addenda
A (Statutes) & B (Certificate). Defendant also stated that he was not contesting the initial
weapons check outside the emergency room (R.70: 5). Instead, defendant's challenge was
limited to the second pat down search. According to defendant, the mental health unit, not
the police, "has an obligation to do the [second] search if there's one to be done at that point"
(R.70: 6).
The prosecutor responded that defendant was effectively arrested when he was taken
into protective custody and, therefore, since defendant did not contest the "arrest," any
subsequent search was authorized incident to the arrest (R. 55-58; R.70: 8-9). When defense
6

In addition to failing to preserve these issues below, defendant failed to present
them in his Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, filed in this Court
April 24, 2001. Only issues raised in the petition may be considered under a grant of
review. See UTAH R. APP. P. 5(c) & (e).
9

counsel protested that defendant was not arrested, but in protective custody pursuant to
Utah's involuntary commitment statutes, the prosecutor opined that the difference was one
of "semantics" since defendant was handcuffed and involuntarily detained (R.70: 8). The
prosecutor further argued that because the Certificate for Commitment authorized the police
to take defendant into protective custody, which the prosecutor termed a "civil arrest," the
police could also search him for safety reasons and inventory purposes (R.70: 9).
Throughout this discussion, defendant never challenged the validity of the civil detention.7
In stark contrast, defendant now claims the Certificate for Commitment signed by Dr.
Weber was "defective and invalid" and, therefore, defendant's involuntary commitment
illegal. See Br.Aplt. at 15-16. Defendant may not, however, circumvent on appeal his
concessions below. SeeCityofOrem

v.Henrie, 868P.2d 1384,1387-88 (Utah App. 1994).

Therefore, any challenge to the validity of defendant's detention is waived. Id.
Similarly, defendant may not now object to the manner in which the trial court
decided the issue when defendant did not do so below. Here, it was recognized that the issue

7

Defendant's only contention was that if defendant was actually "arrested," as
opposed to civilly detained based on the doctor's certificate, then the arrest must be by
warrant (R.70: 8). But the involuntary commitment statute contemplates that a police
officer - even without a doctor's certificate - may seize and detain a mentally ill and
dangerous individual. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-12-232(2). While that subsection
requires the police to make "application for commitment" after transporting and
delivering the detainee to a mental health unit, failure to make such application would
only affect the right of the mental health unit to continue to hold the individual, not the
right of the police to seize and transport him. See id. In any case, the court found that
here the police were proceeding under the doctor's Certification for Commitment (R. 49,
52).
10

of a protective custody search was one of first impression in Utah; however, the court opined
that there must be cases in the United States which directly address the issue, because after
all, "[pjeople are taken into custody on civil commitments quite frequently. Surely there's
been other cases where in the process of taking that person into custody and delivering them
to a mental health facility either weapons or contraband or something was discovered" (R.70:
10-11). Defense counsel responded that he had "looked and I didn't see anything in regard
to that" (R.70: 11). The court replied that the matter would be taken under advisement so
that hopefully, "we can find some authority that's on point" (R.70:11). Defendant did not
object.

Eventually, the court found that authority, State v. Lowrimore, 841P.2d 779

(Wash. App. 1992), which recognized the permissibility of a search incident to protective
custody and the emergency nature of such a search (R. 50-52).8 The trial court found
Washington's interpretation of their involuntary commitment statute consistent with Utah's
statutorily authorized involuntary commitment procedure and with Utah's emergency aid
exception as recognized mState v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12,fflf12-13,994 P.2d 1283 (R.
51-53). The trial court then denied defendant's motion to suppress (R. 53).
For the first time on appeal, defendant protests the manner in which the court reached
its decision. Defendant claims that he was denied due process because the memorandum
decision "advanced new theories of which the Defendant neither had notice or an opportunity
to address" (Br.Aplt. at 14). While defendant does not identify what theory is "new,"
8

As will be discussed, there are several jurisdictions which have directly
addressed the issue and come to the similar conclusions, albeit under differing theories.
11

presumptively, he is referring to the emergency aid doctrine, since that theory was not
directly discussed at the hearing.
Nevertheless, the emergency nature of the involuntary commitment procedure was
undisputed. Defendant admitted that "exigent circumstances" may have existed when the
police initially confronted defendant; defendant was not challenging that point (R.70: 5).9
Nor could he. It was undisputed that defendant was out of control, threatening individuals,
and pounding on the glass doors of a public building (R. 43-44; R.69: 4-5). Moreover,
section 62 A-12-231, cited by defendant and relied upon by the trial court, characterizes an
involuntary commitment to be an "emergency" procedure, as did the Certificate for
Commitment, which defendant attached to his motion to suppress memorandum. See
Addenda A (Statutes) & B (Certificate). Below, the dispute was not whether an emergency
existed, but, as defendant argued, whether the emergency continued once defendant was
sedated and hand-cuffed (R.70: 4-5). Under these circumstances, the court's reliance on the
emergency aid exception as an alternative ground for its ruling was a natural derivative from
the evidence and legal arguments articulated by counsel.
In sum, based on defendant's concession that he was not challenging the civil
detention, the trial court properly considered two grounds in denying defendant's motion to
suppress: search incident to protective custody and the emergency aid exception.

9

As will be discussed, the "exigent circumstances" exception is not the same as
the "emergency" exception, the exception at issue in this case. Nevertheless, in common
usage, an exigency and an emergency are synonymous. See Webster's 3rd International
Dictionary (1993 unabridged version).
12

(B) Utah 9s Involuntary Commitment Statutes Implicitly Authorize a Safety
and Inventory Search Incident to Protective Custody.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law which is reviewed on appeal for
correctness. State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, ^ 8 (citation omitted). Generally, a court's
"primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidence by
the plain language." Id. at ^ 13 (citation and quotation marks omitted). In effectuating
legislative intent, a statute may be interpreted to grant an agency implied powers which are
"reasonably necessary to effectuate its express powers." Bennion v. ANR Production Co.,
819 P.2d 343,350 (Utah 1991). This is especially true where the failure to recognize powers
necessary and incident to express statutory duties would "run contrary to the entire spirit and
purpose of the law." Utah Copper Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah etal., 193 P. 24,
27 (Utah 1920).
In this case, the trial court concluded that Utah's involuntary commitment statutes
provide "implied authorization to conduct a safety and inventory search" of persons being
taken into protective custody because those individuals are a "danger to themselves or others
and allowing the search will protect him [or her] as well as others" (R. 50). Section 62 A-12231 provides that an adult "may not be involuntarily committed to the custody of a local
mental health authority except under the . . . emergency procedures for temporary
commitment" provided in section 62A-12-232. Section 62A-12-232(l)(a) provides, in
pertinent part, for the temporary involuntary commitment of mentally ill individuals who,
based on a doctor's certification, are "likely to cause serious injury to himself or others if not
13

immediately restrained." Section 62 A-12-232( 1 )(b) expressly "authorizes any peace officer
to take the [certified] individual into the custody of a local mental health authority and
transport the individual to that authority's designated facility." Section 62A-12-232(4)
further mandates that the authorized transportation "shall be conducted by the appropriate
. . . law enforcement authority . . . by ambulance." The trial court interpreted these
provisions to provide implicit authorization to search incident to

statute's express

authorization to seize and transport.10
Defendant does not dispute that Utah's involuntary commitment statues impose an
express duty on the police to take into protective custody and transport mentally ill
individuals who are likely to be dangerous to themselves or others. See Br.Aplt. at 16.
Instead, defendant challenges what the court called a "common sense conclusion" that "an
officer be allowed to conduct a search of a dangerous individual when taking him or her into
[protective] custody" (R. 50). See Br.Aplt at 17-18.
It is well-established that a "contemporaneous, warrantless search of the area within
an arrestee's immediate control is permissible for the purpose of recovering weapons the
arrestee might reach, or to prevent concealment or destruction of evidence of the crime."
State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 978 (Utah App. 1998). Accord State v. Chevre, 2000 UT
10

In its decision, the court cited subsection (l)(b) of section 62A-12-231 (R. 50).
However, that subsection provides only that commitment must be done in compliance
with section 62A-12-232. In context, it is clear the citation is a typographical error and
the court intended to reference subsection (l)(b) of section 62 A-12-232, which
specifically authorizes police detention and transportation of an individual who is
involuntary committed. See Addendum B.
14

App 6, Tf 14, 994 P.2d 1278. In this case, it is undisputed that a criminal arrest did not occur
when defendant was taken into protective custody. Nevertheless, as the prosecutor pointed
out, protective custody is analogous to arrest: defendant was seized and transported in
handcuffs to a facility where he would be held against his will (R.70: 9). See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 62A-12-232(3) (authorizing involuntary detention for a minimum of twenty-four
hours, but which may be extended through further application). The trial court agreed.
As previously discussed, in reaching its conclusion, the court relied on Lowrimore,
841 P.2d at 782-83, a Washington appellate decision which concluded that Washington's
involuntary commitment statue implicitly authorized a search incident to custody for the
protection of the mentally ill individual, the officer, and others (R. 51). *l In Lowrimore, 841
P.2d at 780, a juvenile was taken into protective custody because she was suicidal. The
police searched her purse and discovered three knives, drug paraphernalia, marijuana pipes,
and a set of scales. Id. In concluding that the Washington involuntary commitment statute
implicitly authorized a search, the appellate court explained that a safety search was a
necessary incident to protective custody based on the dangerousness and emergency nature
of involuntary commitment. Id. at 784-85. And while defendant is correct that Lowrimore
relies primarily on the emergency exception, see Br.Aplt. at 17, this does not undercut the

11

The Washington statute is similar to Utah's and permits a police officer to take
an individual into protective custody and transport him to a treatment facility whenever
there is "reasonable cause to believe that such person is suffering from a mental disorder
and presents an imminent likelihood of serious harm to others or himself or is in
imminent danger because of being gravely disabled." Lowrimore, 841 P.2d at 781.
15

Washington court's recognition that safety and inventory searches may be conducted incident
to civil detention. Indeed, the court recognized that safety concerns were more acute in civil
protective detentions than in criminal detentions because the mentally ill detainee not only
presents a danger to the officer and others, but also presents a substantial danger to himself.
Lowrimore, 841 P.2d at 782-83. Thus, the scope of the permissible search incident to civil
detention is necessarily broader than a pat down for weapons. Id. Accord State v. Dempsey,
947 P.2d 265, 269 (Wash. App. 1997) (recognizing that a search of a person being civilly
committed is not limited to a weapons pat down); State v. Mason, 782 P.2d 572, 572-73
(Wash App. 1989) (upholding a police search of a suicidal individual in protective custody,
which search resulted in the discovery of drugs), cert, denied, 790 P.2d 168 (Wash. 1990).
Other courts agree. In People v. Yaniak, 2001 WL 1699044 (N.Y.Co.Ct. 2001), the
defendant was taken into protective custody pursuant to New York's Mental Hygiene Law
and transported by the police to a hospital. At the hospital, the police searched defendant's
wallet to determine his identify and found marijuana and LSD inside. 2001 WL 1699044,
*2. The search was upheld on the grounds of search incident to "arrest." The New York
court held that even though the wallet was not searched immediately upon defendant being
taken into custody, the wallet was merely an extension of the person and "reasonably
contemporaneous with the arrest." Id. at *3-4. See also additional cases, infra, upholding
similar searches under the emergency exception.
Here, even defendant admitted that the police had the right to search for weapons
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when they first took defendant into custody (R.70: 5). Consequently, as will be discussed
more fully in the context of the emergency aid exception, despite having performed a cursory
weapons check before handcuffing and sedating defendant, the police were nevertheless
entitled to do a more "complete pat down" before removing the handcuffs and fully releasing
defendant to the hospital. Cf State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1238 (Utah 1996)
(recognizing that if exigent circumstances justify a roadside vehicle search, the vehicle may
still be permissibly searched once impounded and removed from the road). And in
conducting that "complete pat down," the police were entitled not only to search for weapons
but for any substance which could present a danger to defendant and/or others. Cf.
Lowrimore, 841 P.2d at 783 (recognizing the need to protect a person involuntary committed
from himself).

Accord UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-12-232(1) (permitting involuntary

commitment to protect mentally ill individual from harming self). For similar reasons, an
inventory of the possessions an individual has on him during involuntary commitment
transportation and admission is warranted. Cf. State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217,1220-21 (Utah
App.) (recognizing individual and police safety and property interests protected by an
inventory search), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).12 And even if a mental health unit
might subsequently conduct its own search of a patient, that fact does not diminish the

12

Because the search in this case only involved a search of defendant's person, the
trial court did not use the term "inventory search" in its classic sense, i.e., a search of an
impounded vehicle. See Gray, 851 P.2d at 1220. Presumptively, if an individual was
taken into protective custody while in control of a vehicle, the police would follow
normal vehicle impound procedures.
17

reasonableness or necessity of the police conducting safety and inventory searches during
the time in which the individual, by statutory mandate, is under police supervision.
Defendant disputes the trial court's incident-to-custody ruling by alleging that
defendant was not legally detained. See Br.Aplt. at 16. As already discussed, supra at 9-10,
defendant cannot on appeal contradict his concession below. Next, defendant claims any
statutory authorization to search must meet constitutional standards. See Br.Aplt. at 17-19.
The State agrees. But the Constitution does not require probable cause for a weapons patdown, a search incident to arrest, or an emergency search. State v. Warren, 2001 UT App
346, H 13, 37 P.3d 270 (applying Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), requirement of
"reasonable belief to weapons pat-down); Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, K 15 (recognizing
emergency aid exception only requires "some reasonable basis"); Chevrt, 2000 UT App 6,
f 14 (upholding permissibility of a search incident to any "lawful custodial arrest").
In sum, the trial court correctly concluded that if the police are statutorily mandated
to take an individual into protective custody and transport them to a mental health unit, they
also have implicit authority to conduct a safety and inventory search. In other words, if the
detention is statutorily authorized, the search incident to it is constitutionally authorized.
(C) Under the Facts of this Case, the Search Was Also Justified Under the
Emergency Aid Exception.
Alternatively, the trial court ruled that the search was permissible under the
emergency aid exception articulated in Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, f^f 12-13. Courts which
have addressed the issue of protective custody searches have likewise upheld them on this
18

ground. See State v. Hutchins, 636 So.2d 552, 553-54 (Fla. App. 1994); Dempsey, 947 P.2d
at 268-69; Lowrimore, 841 P.2d at 783-84; State v. Horngren, 617 N.W.2d 508, 511-12
(Wis. App.), cert, denied, 619 N.W.2d 95 (Wis. 2000). See also 3 Wayne R. LaFave &
David C. Baum, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 5.4(c) at 16364(1996).13
As the trial court correctly noted, the emergency aid exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement exists when the State establishes that:
(1) the police have an "objectively reasonable basis to believe that an
emergency exists" and that "there is an immediate need for their assistance for
the protection of life;"
(2) the police search is "not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize
evidence;"and,
(3) "[t]here is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the areas
or place to be searched."
Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, ^

12, 17, & 26 (adopting the standard articulated in State v.

Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 550 (Utah App. 1997) (Greenwood, J., concurring in result)). While
the trial court's legal conclusion is reviewed for correctness, its underlying factual findings
are reviewed for clear error. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, ^ 8. Because the determination
of the emergency exception is "fact-intensive," id. at \ 10, defendant is required to marshal
13

Numerous other courts have applied the emergency doctrine in analogous
situations. See, e.g., State v. Blade, 626 A.2d 273, 618-24 (Conn. 1993) (missing person
report); State v. Jones, 947 P.2d 1030, 1035-38 (Kan. App. 1997) (request for welfare
check); People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609-10 (N.Y. App. 1976) (missing person
report); and State v. Mountford, 769 A.2d 639, 643-646 (Ver. 2000) (emergency medical
attention for extreme intoxication).
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the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then show, when viewing the
evidence in the "light most favorable to the trial court's ruling," why the findings are
erroneous. See State in re J.W., 2001 UT App 208, H 9, 30 P.3d 1232. The marshaling
requirement applies even when the evidence is undisputed - for an appellant must still argue
all "supporting" evidence. Cf. id.
Here, defendant has wholly failed to do so. Ignoring the evidence in support of the
trial court's ruling, defendant baldly asserts that no nexus existed between the search of
defendant's person and the need to assist in the protection of life, and that the search was
done with an intent to discover evidence. See Br.Aplt. at 19. But defendant does not explain
why the court's contrary findings, based on the undisputed evidence, are wrong. He simply
and impermissibly "reargues the weight of that evidence." See J. W., 2001 UT App. 208, \
10. Defendant's challenge, therefore, may be summarily rejected. See State v. Gamblin,
2000 UT 44, H 17 & n.2, 1 P.3d 1108. Alternatively, if the merits are considered, the trial
court's ruling is correct.
Contrary to defendant's argument, the emergency aid exception does not require
probable cause and does not require proof of "imminent danger of life or limb." Those are
components of two separate exceptions. See Davidson, 2000 UT App 12,ffi[10-12 & 15
(distinguishing requirements of emergency doctrine with probable cause requirement of
"exigent circumstances" doctrine and distinguishing emergency doctrine from "imminent
danger" requirement in caretaking stops of vehicles). See also Mountford, 769 A.2d at 644-
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45 & n.l.

Instead, whether an emergency exists is dependent on a "pragmatic and

contingent" determination of the reasonableness of the police action in light an officer's
"multiple" caretaking responsibilities.

See Debra Livingston, Police,

Community

Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. Chi. Legal. F. 261, 261-63.
Here, there clearly was an emergency. Defendant was sufficiently violent and out of
control that his own mother and doctor felt threatened and locked the doors of a public
building to keep him out (R. 44; R.69: 4-5). When the police arrived, defendant was more
subdued (he was sitting rather than pounding on the doors) but still sufficiently agitated that
an armed police officer would not approach him until accompanied by other officers (R. 44;
R.69:4). The officers not only relied on their own observations of defendant, but also spoke
to defendant's doctor, caseworkers, and mother (R. 44; R.69: 4-6). This alone provided an
objectively reasonable basis to believe an emergency existed.
In addition, the police had a Certificate for Commitment (R. 43). Defendant's doctor,
who dealt with him on a routine basis, had concluded that he was a "danger to himself or
others if not immediately restrained" (id.).

Moreover, the Certificate was entitled

"Emergency Procedure" (id), and the commitment statutes characterize the involuntary
procedure as an "emergency." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-12-231(1). Thus, even if the
officers had not subjectively believed that the involuntary commitment was an emergency,
the doctor, the certificate, and the statutes provided an objective basis from which to
conclude it was.
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Defendant does not contest that an emergency existed outside the doctor's office
(R.70: 4-5), but argues that any emergency dissipated once the police arrived and defendant
was sedated and handcuffed. See Br.Aplt. at 19. This ignores the realities of the situation.
Defendant was handcuffed and sedated because he was out of control. At any point in the
transportation and admission process, defendant had the potential to become agitated and
violent. Indeed, that is exactly what the doctor's certificate told the officers: defendant was
a danger unless restrained. Having reached the Logan Regional Hospital, the officers were
now required to "unrestrain" him by removing the handcuffs so he could be fully admitted
to the hospital. And presumptively, defendant's sedation would, at some point, diminish.
Utah's involuntary commitment statutes do not characterize only the initial outburst as the
emergency - a view defendant advocates - the statutes properly recognize that the entire
transportation and commitment procedure is an "emergency." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 62 A12-231(1). See also Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1238 (recognizing that once an exigency is
established, it does not necessarily extinguish merely because the object to be searched is
taken to a safer location).
The trial court could rightfully not "conceive of a more compelling case" that an
emergency existed (R. 52). Further, since the search was only of defendant's person and
occurred during the process of admitting him into a mental health facility, the court properly
found that the search met the second and third Davidson requirements (R. 52-53). Indeed,
as the trial court noted, "[u]nder the circumstances multiple searches would not only be

22

reasonable but prudent as if the Defendant had hurt himself or someone else with a weapon
or other item the whole world fault the officers" (R. 52).
In sum, defendant has failed to establish that the trial court's findings that the police
were properly responding to an emergency when they searched defendant are in error.
* * *

Under either of the trial court's theories, the police were mandated to take defendant
into emergency protective custody and were entitled, before turning him over to the mental
health facility, to perform a "complete pat-down" of defendant. In performing that search,
a closed knife sheath was discovered. The sheath contained methamphetamine. Upon
discovery of the methamphetamine, the police had probable cause to arrest defendant, and
any further search was permissible incident to that arrest.14

14

As previously noted, see note 5, the search of defendant's wallet is not at issue
in this case. If it were, the search could be justified under the trial court's ruling.
Alternatively, once the methamphetamine was discovered, any further search of
defendant was justified as a search incident to his arrest on the felony drug charge. See
Lowrimore, 841 P.2d at 784-85 (recognizing that once drugs are found on a person in
protective custody, any further search beyond that permitted incident to or by the
emergency commitment, would be justified under traditional search incident to arrest
principles).
23

CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and
remand the case to the district court for trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this C&H day of March, 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney Gen«
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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defendant/appellant, 102 South 100 West, P.O. Box 461, Brigham City, UT 84302, this
< ^ U a y of March, 2002.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

62A-12-231. Involuntary commitment — Procedures.
(D An adult may not be involuntarily committed to the
custody of a local mental health authonty except under the
following provisions
(a) emergency procedures for temporary commitment
upon medical or designated examiner certification, as
provided in Subsection 62A-12-232(1),
(b) emergency procedures for temporary commitment
without endorsement of medical or designated examiner
certification, as provided in Subsection 62A-12-232(2), or
(c) commitment on court order, as provided in Section
62A-12-234
(2) A person under 18 years of age may not be committed to
a local mental health authority, but may be committed to the
division in accordance with the provisions of Part 2A.
1993

62A-12-232. Temporary commitment — Requirements
and procedures.
(1) (a) An adult may be temporarily, involuntarily committed to a local mental health authority upon
(i) written application by a responsible person who
has reason to know, stating a belief that the individual is likely to cause senous injury to himself or
others if not immediately restrained and stating the
personal knowledge of the individual s condition or
circumstances which lead to that belief, and
(u) a certification by a licensed physician or designated examiner stating that the physician or designated examiner has examined the individual within a
three-day period immediately preceding that certification, and that he is of the opinion that the individual is mentally ill and, because of his mental
illness, is likely to injure himself or others if not
immediately restrained
(b) Application and certification as described in Subsection (IXa) authorizes any peace officer to take the
individual into the custody of a local mental health
authonty and transport the individual to that authority s
designated facility
(2) If a duly authorized peace officer observes a person
involved in conduct that gives the officer probable cause to
believe that the person is mentally ill, as defined in Section
62A-12-202, and because of that apparent mental illness and
conduct, there is a substantial likelihood of senous harm to
that person or others, pending proceedings for examination
and certification under this part, the officer may take that
person into protective custody The peace officer shall transport the person to be transported to the designated facihtv of
the appropriate local mental health authonty pursuant to this
section either on the basis of his own observation or on the
basis of a mental health officer s observation that has been
reported to him by that mental health officer Immediately
thereafter, the officer shall place the person in the custody of
the local mental health authonty and make application for
commitment of that person to the local mental health authority The application shall be on a prescribed form and shall
include the following
(a) a statement by the officer that he believes, on the
basis of personal observation or on the basis of a mental
health officer's observation reported to him by the mental
health officer, that the person is, as a result of a mental
illness, a substantial and immediate danger to himself or
others,
(b) the specific nature of the danger,
(c) a summary of the observations upon which the
statement of danger is based, and
(d) a statement offsets which called the person to the
attention of the officer
(3) A person committed under this section may be held for a
maximum of 24 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays At the expiration of that time penod, the
person shall be released unless application for involuntary
commitment has been commenced pursuant to Section 62A12-234 If that application has been made, an order of detention may be entered under Subsection 62A-12-234(3) If no
order of detention is issued, the patient shall be released
unless he has made voluntary application for admission
(4) Transportation of mentally ill persons pursuant to Subsections (1) and (2) shall be conducted by the appropnate
municipal or city or town law enforcement authority or,
under the appropriate law enforcement s authority, by ambulance to the extent that Subsection (5) applies However, if the
designated facility is outside of that authonty's junsdiction,
the appropriate county sheriff shall transport the person or
cause the person to be transported by ambulance to the extent
that Subsection (5) applies
(5) Notwithstanding Subsections (2) and (4), a peace officer
shall cause a person to be transported by ambulance if the
person meets anv of the criteria in Section 26-8a-305 In
addition if the person requires physical medical attention the
peace officer shall direct that transportation be to an appropnate medical facihtv for treatment
law
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. t^RTIFICATE FOR COMMITMENT »0 THE
^LOCAL MENTAL HEALTH AUTHORITY
EMERCENCY PROCEDURE
do hereby certify that I am a
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physician licensed under the laws of the State of Utah to practice medicine, or a medical officer
of the United States Government \n the State of Utah in the performance of my^offrcial duties, or
a designated examiner appointed by the Division^ MentalJjMlth thaU have examined within
thres days of the date of this certificate
and am of the opinion that the said
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self or others if not

immediately, restrained. The pertinent
M data which I have obtain^
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'Cross out items not applicable.
INSTRUCTIONS
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For emergency commitment of an individual who, in the judgment of the applicant and a
iVU t

licensed physician or designated examiner, cannot go unrestrained. If a physician or designated
— . — — —

-,,,
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*\\/% M

examiner is not available, a peace officer or a mental health officer with personafknowledge of
the situation may use DMH Form 34-2. A peace officer maTTiins^rt Vpatfeht using DMH
Form 34-2 (pink) pursuant to this provision either on the basis of his or her own observation or
on the basis of the obseivation of a mental health officer reported by the mental health officer.
The application of either 34-1 or 34-2 authorizes a peace officer to take the proposed patient
into custody, and transport him or her to a mental health facility.
Any person admitted under this section may be held for a maximum of 24 hours excluding
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. At the expiration of that time period, the person shall be
released unless application for involuntary hospitalization has been commenced pursuant to
section 62a-12-234

\f such application has been made an order of detention may be entered by

the court pursuant to subsection (3) of section 62a-12-234. If no order of detention is issued, the
patient shall be released except when the patient has made voluntary application for admission.
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Addendum C

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF
UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.

Case No. 001100553

CURTIS W. COLLINS,

HON. BEN H. HADFIELD

Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The
facts are not in dispute. On 27 July 2000, Deputy Ericksen responded to a call on an
"out of control" individual at the Bear River Mental Health facility. He found the
Defendant sitting on the steps infrontof the building. Additional officers arrived. The
officers then learned that the Defendant had come with his mother for his regular
appointment with his doctor, but that Defendant's mother and the case worker at the
Mental Health facility locked the Mental Health Facility door behind Mr. Collins when
he went outside the facility because Mr. Collins was our of control and they were afraid
for their safety.
The doctor then emerged with a "Certificate for Commitment to the Local
Mental Health Authority" form that met the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 62 A-12232(A)(1) including his opinion that Defendant was "likely to injure himself or others
if not immediately restrained." The Doctor requested that the officers take the
Defendant into custody and transport him to the hospital. The officers took the
Defendant into custody and walked him across the parking lot to the emergency room.

At this point the officers apparently conducted a search of the Defendant and found
several items in the Defendant's boots, but a knife sheath in his pants went undetected.
The emergency room staff medicated the Defendant to calm him down.
The officers then turned the Defendant over to another officer and the
ambulance crew who transported the Defendant to Logan Regional Hospital. During
the transport, the Defendant was handcuffed. The officer's did another pat down search
of the Defendant during the admittance process at Logan Regional Hospital. During this
search they found a knife sheath that had been hidden around the Defendant's genitalia.
One of the officers opened the knife sheath and found a small baggy with a white
powdery substance and several pieces of foil with a burnt substance on it and a straw.
The white powdery substance tested positive for methamphetamine. Defendant now
seeks to suppress the evidence from the knife sheath.
In this case the officers did not arrest the Defendant but were taking him into
custody pursuant to the State's involuntary commitment procedure pursuant to statute.
The statute authorizes the Defendant be taken into custody when a physician or
examiner certifies the need or when the officer has probable cause to believe the person
is mentally ill and that there is a substantial likelihood that the mental illness and
conduct may result in the individual seriously harming himself or others. Utah Code
Ann. § 62A-12-231( I )(b) The court believes there is an implied authorization to conduct
a safety and inventory search of such an individual in such circumstances because he
or she is a danger to themselves or others and allowing the search will protect him as
well as others. Common sense dictates that an officer be allowed to conduct a search
of a dangerous individual when taking him or her into custody. Independent of any
other analysis, the court holds that Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-231(1 )(a) and 232(4)

J

authorizes a search incident to taking a proposed mental health patient into custody. Cf.
State v. Lowrimore, 67 Wn. App. 949,956-57, 841 P.2d 779, 783 (1992)("the purpose
of the search impliedly authorized [by the analogous Washington statute] is the
protection of others, not limited to the officer in question, and often, as in the case
before us, primarily for the protection of the individual detained.")
Even if the search was not impliedly authorized by the statute, the court finds
that the officers were engaged in a valid community caretaking role so that the searches
came within the "emergency circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement. This
exception has its roots in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.
2d 706 (1973) where the U.S. Supreme Court found that the warrantless search of the
trunk of a car for a service revolver did not violate the fourth amendment because the
officers were performing a community caretaking role in retrieving the potentially
dangerous instrument. The Cady case has been extended to a variety of circumstances
around the country, including, in Utah, validating a stop of a vehicle because the officer
suspected a potential suicide. See Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) ajfd Provo City v. Warden, 875 P.2d 557 (1994) see also Wright v. State, 7
S.W.3d 148 (Ct. Crim. App. Tx. 1999)(discussing the various cases from around the
country). Justice Greenwood suggested the exception as an alternate way to affirm in
State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(Officers conducted search to find
missing child). Her suggestion was picked up and adopted as Utah law by the court in
Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 994 P.2d 1238 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)(fmding the emergency
aid exception could allow a warrantless search of a bystander of an overdose victim but
that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings to satisfy the connection between
the emergency and the search) but see State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145 (Utah Ct. App.
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1997)(drug victim that may have needed medical attention but confession did not come
under emergency circumstances where officers could have given Miranda warnings
before asking question designed to render medical assistance).
Whether the emergency circumstances or the community caretaker exception
are separate exceptions or one in the same, a search incident to taking a mental health
patient into custody should qualify. See State v. Lowrimore, 841 P.2d 779 (Wn Ct. App.
1992)(search of juvenile's purse and container within purse valid under emergency
circumstances where juvenile had threatened suicide); State v. Brock, 782 P.2d 5 72 (Wn.
Ct. App. 1989)(mental health patient, multiple pat downs valid). Assuming that the test
for the emergency exception applies in this circumstance, the court must find that:
(1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an
emergency exists and believe there is an immediate need for their
assistance for the protection of life.
(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and
seize evidence.
(3) There is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with
the area or place to be searched. That is, there must be a connection
with the area to be searched and the emergency.
Davidson, 994 P.2d at 1290. There can be no doubt the officers had an objectively
reasonable basis to believe an emergency existed. They had a documentfroman expert,
eyewitness statements, and their own observations. The court cannot conceive of a
more compelling case. Under the circumstances multiple searches would not only be
reasonable but prudent as if the Defendant had hurt himself or someone else with a
weapon or other item the whole world would fault the officers. The court finds that the
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search was not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize the evidence. Finally,
the only "area" searched was the Defendant's person. The nexus between the danger to
the Defendant and others is obvious.
The court notes that the Defendant was sedated and that he was handcuffed
during the trip to Logan, but these facts make no difference. Again, if the officers had
not been diligent in searching the Defendant and he had harmed himself or another, no
one would raise the unreasonableness of such a search in defense of the officers.
Under either an implied statutory right or the community caretaker or
emergency circumstances exceptions, the motion to suppress is denied.
Dated this

£

day of April 2001.

